Unintended Consequences of Devolution: Regionalization and Secessionist Politics in Contemporary Western Europe by Deering, Liam
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF DEVOLUTION 
REGIONALIZATION AND SECESSIONIST POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN 
EUROPE 
 
 
 
Liam David Deering 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political 
Science, Concentration European Governance. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2017 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Robert M. Jenkins 
 
Liesbet Hooghe 
 
Gary Marks
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2017 
Liam David Deering 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Liam David Deering: Unintended Consequences of Devolution 
Regionalization and Secessionist Politics in Contemporary Western Europe 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Jenkins) 
 
 
 This thesis seeks to show that in a region with pre-existing secessionist sentiment, the 
creation of a regional legislative institution and an accompanied devolution of powers and 
competencies to this institution leads to a regionalization of the region’s (and possibly central 
state’s) party system. This regionalization of the party system fosters support for explicitly 
secessionist parties by providing them access to the government and to the media.  
 The process of devolution occurred in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland during the late 
twentieth century and continued into the twenty-first century. These three regions will act as 
evidence of this regionalization and the strengthening of secessionist parties as a result of the 
creation of a regional legislative institution and the subsequent devolution of powers and 
competencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Secessionism is one of the bigger threats to state sovereignty and the integrity of modern 
borders in today’s world (Mulle, 2015; Wellman, 2012). Secessionist ideology in Western Europe 
has seen a resurgence over the last half century or so. Some of the most prominent Western 
European states are experiencing some sort of sub-state secessionist movement, including: 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Belgium (Beary, 2011; Beary, 2012; 
Coppieters, 2012). In the literature on secessionism, there is often confusion surrounding the 
difference between secessionism and separatism; some authors opting to refer to these Western 
European movements as separatist (Beary, 2011, 2012; Doyle, 2012; Wellman, 2012, etc.) whilst 
others classify them as secessionist (Anderson, 2004; Buchanan, 1995, 1997, 2004, Coppieters, 
2012; McGarry, 1998; Norman, 1998 etc.). This paper accepts the distinction that is offered by 
Allen Buchanan (2004: 227); he argues that secession occurs when a region breaks away from a 
functioning state and separatism is when a region breaks away from a failing or failed state. 
Three of the most active secessionist movements in Western Europe today are the Catalan, 
Flemish, and Scottish secessionist movements. All three of these regions – Catalonia, Flanders, 
and Scotland – have experienced a major act of devolution within the last half century. Devolution 
can take many different forms. In all three of these cases, and for the purposes of this study, 
devolution is defined as the creation of a recognized regional legislative institution and the 
allocation of various competencies and powers to this new institution that were previously held by 
the state1. 
                                                        
1 State, here, refers to the central state. 
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This paper seeks to show that in a sub-state region where there is a strong secessionist 
sentiment, the creation of an official regional legislative institution accompanied with a devolution 
of powers and competencies to this newly created regional institution leads to the regionalization2 
of the party system. This devolution and the regionalization of the party system creates an 
environment in which the secessionist movement can cement itself into the region’s political 
system, strengthening its abilities to organize for a move towards secession.  
The reasoning behind the major act of devolution in each of the three cases vary, but one 
significant component is the same: all three states witnessed pressure from a political organization 
(either a party or an ‘underground’ movement) to re-organize the region’s position within the state. 
The Catalans, Flemish, and Scottish have differing experiences in terms of oppression they have 
experienced from their respective states. Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom also have 
distinctly different state structures, party systems, and electoral systems that play a role in 
understanding the effects of devolution in each case. Additionally, the manner in which support 
for secession and devolution was organized in each case is different, which is important to 
understanding how the creation of each regional legislative institution and its accompanying 
devolution of powers and competencies affected the party systems of each region and their 
secessionist movements. It is also important to understand the claims making of the three 
secessionist movements. Understanding this claims making can provide insight into what the 
movements want the most, allowing us to better comprehend how the creation of a regional 
legislative institution and a major act of devolution can affect their secessionist parties. 
This thessis begins with a discussion of the existing literature in the field of devolution 
studies. This discussion will set up the theoretical framework through which the three case studies 
                                                        
2 Regionalization in terms of the dominance of the party system by regional parties rather than state-wide 
parties. 
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will be analyzed. This theoretical framework provides the basis for how a major act of devolution 
can regionalize a party system and strengthen secessionist parties. 
The following section highlights the most important differences and similarities and 
institutional structures of the three regions prior to their major acts of devolution. This section is 
followed by a discussion on the devolution itself. This discussion entails a description of the 
regional legislative institution itself, the competencies and powers that were devolved, and an 
analysis of the regional (or secessionist) parties that were leading the charge during the devolution 
process. 
The analysis of the post-devolution time periods in each case study is important as it helps 
us understand how the party systems were regionalized and how the secessionist movements were 
affected by both the devolution and this regionalization. This section of the paper will discuss the 
solidification of the regionalization of the party systems, a shift in claims making from the pre-
devolution time period, and how the support for regional and secessionist parties has increased. 
Analyzing this claims making is important to understanding how this devolution and 
regionalization has affected the secessionist movements and their secessionist parties.  
The breakdown of the analysis of devolution into pre-, during, and post-devolution sections 
allows for a better understanding of how this devolution affected the regional and secessionist 
parties and the movements. After this comprehensive analysis of the pre-devolution, devolution, 
and post-devolution time period has been completed for each case, the paper moves on to analyze 
how devolution in Western European liberal democracies with a region with a secessionist 
sentiment leads to a regionalization of the party system.   
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DEVOLUTION, REGIONALIZATION, AND SECESSIONISM 
The effects of devolution on the party system 
 A push for devolution by a sub-state region with secessionist sentiments creates a serious 
dilemma for states. Should the state create a regional legislative institution for this region? Will 
devolving various powers to this region appease their claims for secession or will it just facilitate 
future moves towards secession? 
 Brancati (2008) argues that political decentralization, through the process of creating a 
regional legislative institution and devolving various powers and competencies to this newly 
created institution, greatly increases the strength of regional parties. Regional parties are more 
likely to succeed in both the national elections and in the elections to this new regional legislative 
institution. This decentralization, which in many cases manifests itself as a federalizing process 
(see: Law, 2012) (as in the Spanish and Belgian cases), creates an environment in which regional 
parties can operate more successfully than when they previously could only compete in national 
elections. Additionally, this newly created institution and its accompanying devolution allow 
regional factions of national parties to break off and compete in the regional elections as a regional 
party (Kyriacou and Morral-Palacín, 2014).  
 A major act of devolution, in a sub-state region with pro-secessionist sentiments, that 
involves the creation of a new regional legislative institution and the devolution of several powers 
and competencies, in effect, regionalizes the region’s party system. Looking at the three cases – 
Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland – it will become clear that the regions’ party systems have been 
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regionalized. In some cases, such as Flanders, it is possible that this regionalization also occurs at 
the state level, where the national legislature is also dominated by regional parties.  
The regionalization effect of creating a regional legislative institution and devolving 
powers to this institution is clear. The Catalan, Flemish, and Scottish cases all demonstrate how 
this major act of devolution changes the region’s party system, shifting it away from state-wide 
parties and towards regional parties, representing the region’s interests both at this new regional 
level and at the state level in the county’s capital. 
Regionalization’s effects on secessionist movements 
 The major act of devolution that involves the creation of a regional legislative institution 
and the devolution of several powers and competencies to this newly created institution leads to 
the regionalization of the region’s (and sometimes state’s) party system. This regionalization, 
which is characterized by the dominance of regional parties in regional (and even national) 
elections, strengthens both non-secessionist parties and pro-secessionist regional parties.  
Just like non-secessionist regional parties, secessionist parties are better able to compete 
for seats at the regional level than at the national level. Their ability to gain more seats at the 
regional level grants them access to media resources, provides them a voice in a governmental 
setting, and allows them to use the tools and resources of the government to help the region 
(Kriacou and Morral-Palacín, 2014). All three of these advantages to being in the regional 
government help these secessionist parties grow in strength. Without this regional institution and 
its devolved powers, it would be very difficult for secessionist parties to get the topic of secession 
on any governmental agenda. When these parties are able to gain access to their regional 
government, they are able to ensure that the topic of secession is a talking point within the 
legislative institution. Putting secession into the official governmental discourse is very important 
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as it allows for more people to hear this secessionist message and also forces other parties to have 
some sort of discussion and take a stance on secession, something they otherwise likely would not 
have done. 
Massetti and Schakel (2016) conducted a study in which they examined various regional 
and secessionist parties throughout the OECD world. They conclude that devolution does in fact 
increase the likelihood of the presence and strength of secessionist parties. They also argue that 
their presence in the government can force them to moderate their calls for secession but can also 
further their cause for secession by creating a political environment in which other parties must 
have a discussion about secession. This discussion is especially pertinent in a political environment 
in which regional parties are obtaining a lot of seats, as in these cases where a major act of 
devolution has occurred. 
Massetti and Schakel (2016) also examine the variation amongst regional parties and why 
some regions have more secessionist parties than others. They find that areas that have a 
distinctively different language and culture are more likely to have secessionist regional parties 
than regions with the same language and a similar culture to the state’s dominant nation. This 
finding holds true in the Catalan and Flemish cases but does not in the Scottish, who whilst 
speaking the same language as the rest of the United Kingdom, operate a strong secessionist 
movement.  
The Catalan, Flemish, and Scottish secessionist movements have been able to promote their 
claims for secession through each of their respective regional legislative institutions. All three of 
these regional legislative institutions are now controlled by parties that are explicitly secessionist 
(JxSí in Catalonia, N-VA in Flanders, and the SNP in Scotland). The strength of these secessionist 
parties is largely due to the devolution that occurred. Secessionist parties are emboldened by their 
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ability to gain seats within these newly created regional legislative institutions (Brancati, 2008). 
The parties are able to operate full-scale campaigns for secession, putting the topic of secession on 
the talking agenda throughout the entire region. 
The institutional legacy of each sub-state region with an active secessionist movement is 
important to understanding the current positioning of each region’s regional and secessionist 
parties (Hopkin, 2009; Brancati, 2008). This institutional legacy includes the state structure, the 
history (or lack thereof) of oppressive behavior on the part of the state, voting structures, and prior 
party structures. After a major change in devolution, like the instances that occurred in Catalonia 
and Flanders throughout the 1970s and 1980s and in Scotland in the late 1990s, the regions’ party 
systems become regionalized, creating an environment in which secessionist parties gain access to 
government and can increase their strength and influence. There are significant variations between 
the regional and secessionist parties in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland that can largely be 
attributed to the different institutional and political heritages of the reasons and the differences in 
claims making of the institutions. 
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PRE-DEVOLUTION 
Legacy of Oppression 
 Immediately following the Spanish Civil War, the victorious group, known as the 
“Francoists” sought to create a unified Spanish state that would project power domestically and 
internationally. In order to complete this hefty task, the Francoists rejected the use of any 
subnational (non-Spanish) languages and the practice of any subnational cultures. This rejection 
was especially pertinent in Catalonia because the Catalans constituted a relatively large, 
centralized, subnational culture. At this time, in the early 1930s, over eighty percent of the 
inhabitants in Catalonia spoke Catalan. This new regime, headed by Francisco Franco, claimed 
that they did not wish to totally eliminate the Catalan language and culture, deciding not to prohibit 
it from being utilized in society’s private spheres (Strubell, 1999). 
 The most intense period of intolerance towards the Catalans and their culture occurred 
between 1939 and 1945 (Dowling, 2013). During this time period, Franco and his regime executed 
thousands of influential and notorious Catalan individuals. The Franco regime believed that by 
oppressing the cultural and linguistic aspects that differentiated the Catalans form the Spaniards, 
he would be able to force them into assimilating to the Spanish culture, creating a “new era of 
cultural and political homogeneity” (Dowling, 2013). Oppression under the Franco regime was 
not unique to the Catalans, but what distinguishes the Catalans from the other oppressed regions 
of Spain is that the Catalans were specifically targeted for their cultural and linguistic composition, 
not simply their political opposition to the Franco government. Andrew Dowling (2013) claims 
that the Catalans were not just oppressed by the government, but that “Catalonia experienced a 
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cultural genocide.” Without a doubt, the several decades leading up to the death of Francisco 
Franco on 20 November 1975 were full of cultural, economic, and political oppression of the 
Catalan nation. 
The modern-day Belgian state was formally founded in the year 1830, following a 
separation from the Netherlands.3 Following the achievement of Belgian independence in 1830, 
the French culture reigned hegemonic throughout this new Belgian state. At this time, there were 
two main regions in Belgium – Wallonia, in the south, and Flanders, in the north. Flanders was an 
economically less successful region of the state, where the economy was agrarian-based, with its 
largest industries having to do with the agricultural sector. Wallonia, during this period, became 
one of the first industrialized region of Europe, encountering a large economic boom (Brans et al., 
2009). 
Interestingly enough, at the time of Belgian independence, the Flemish population, based 
in Flanders, constituted a majority of the population of the state, around 57 percent of the total 
Belgian population. Today, the Flemish population accounts for about 60 percent of Belgium’s 
population (De Winter and Baudewyns, 2009).  Despite the (Dutch-speaking) Flemish holding a 
demographic majority, the official language of Belgium for administrative, military, political, 
legal, educational, and media affairs was French, the language of the Walloon population. 
However, the Constitution of 1831 did grant the Flemish the right to use their language as long as 
French was recognized as the official language of the state, but the Constitution did limit the non-
linguistic cultural rights of the Flemish (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009). Due to the hegemony of the 
French language in cultural, economic, and political life, the Belgian capital of Brussels, which is 
                                                        
3 It may not be very significant, but it is interesting to note that Belgium itself was formed via a 
secessionist movement in the not so distant past. 
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located within the Flemish territory4, slowly became a French-speaking city within a Dutch-
speaking Flanders. The oppression and discrimination of the Flemish in Belgium was not nearly 
as severe as the oppression of the Catalans in Spain, but it was present nonetheless. It mostly 
presented itself in the form of linguistic and cultural oppression, as the Flemish were required to 
use the minority language, French, within official state business. Additionally, educational policies 
were created and executed through the central government in Brussels, allowing the Flemish little 
influence in the creation of their educational plans, which can have a large effect on cultural and 
linguistic aspects of society. 
Whilst the Catalans were facing severe political, economic, and cultural oppression prior 
to devolution and the Flemish were experiencing some forms of cultural exclusion and 
subordination, the Scottish were not encountering such issues. Scotland and the central 
government of the United Kingdom have had a relatively cooperative history since their union in 
the seventeenth century. Scotland has been able to have its historical languages (Gaelic and Scots) 
recognized and utilized in any way the Scots see fit. The Scots have also been speaking the 
predominant language of the United Kingdom, English, for several centuries, meaning that 
linguistic issues were virtually nonexistent (Töngür, 2014). Politically speaking, the Scottish were 
allowed to vote and participate in British elections as much as anyone else was. It is important to 
remember when considering the differences in the history of oppression between Catalonia, 
Flanders, and Scotland, that Scotland is a part of a union, not a subordinate, subnational unit. The 
United Kingdom is made up of four regions (England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales) that 
joined together to form a union. This is notably different than, for example, Spain wherein the 
                                                        
4 At the time, this was unofficial, as there was no official Flemish territory until the devolution 
process began in the 1970s.  
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central government in Spain rules over the autonomous communities (regional/federal units) in a 
federal manner, not in a voluntary union. 
There are distinct differences between the levels (and types) of oppression that these three 
subnational groups have experienced in relation to their respective central governments. The 
Catalans experienced very harsh and severe oppression under the reign of General Francisco 
Franco that threatened not only their cultural and historical expression, but also threatened their 
very existence within the state. The Flemish experienced a long history of having their culture and 
language subordinated beneath the minority Walloon/French culture and language, making them 
feel less valued within the state (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009). Finally, the Scottish experienced 
very little oppression at the hands of the United Kingdom, of which they were a willing member 
of a union of nations.  
State Structure 
 Prior to the devolution that too place within Spain, Spain was in the process of transitioning 
from an authoritarian military led government to a democratic regime. During the rule of General 
Franco, the Spanish government operated from a centralized military command in which virtually 
no decisions were made below the top, centralized level. Following the death of Franco on 20 
November 1975, a parliamentary monarchy was established (Dowling, 2013).  
The development and implementation of democracy in Spain was not a simple and quick 
process. The Spanish chose to create a federalized democracy that would be composed of 
seventeen comunidades autónomas (autonomous communities – the regional/federal units). One 
of these seventeen comunidades was Catalonia. The Cortes Generales was created as the top 
Spanish legislative institution and was to be elected by all citizens of Spain, with its representatives 
representing their comunidad in the capital, Madrid.  
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In Belgium, before the devolution and federalization project commenced, the state operated 
as a centralized government that was headquartered in the capital, Brussels. During this time 
period, prior to 1970, the Belgian government operated with no semblance of federalism or any 
type of decentralized decision-making processes (Fitzmaurice, 1996). The only way for the 
Flemish to push their political agenda was for them to do so via the centralized Belgian Parliament 
in Brussels. The Walloons and other (small) groups within Belgium were also represented in such 
a way, creating a lot of tension as there was a conglomeration of different groups’ interests coming 
together in one legislative body. 
All four regions of the United Kingdom are represented in the state’s capital, London. The 
British Parliament in Westminster is comprised of members from all four regions. The four regions 
of the United Kingdom, at this time, had no other legislative bodies other than some small country 
level elected positions that held little power or influence. Nearly all governing decisions were 
made in London in a political setting that was undoubtedly dominated by the largest region (by 
far), England.  
The structure of the state in which the Catalans, Flemish, and Scottish resided prior to their 
respective time periods of devolution varied. The Catalans were enduring a time of 
democratization in Spain, in which a federal government was being established and a Spanish party 
system was emerging. The Flemish, on the other hand, resided in Belgium, which was a fully 
centralized state with no federal composition. The Scottish were also in a different situation as 
they were a part of a union of four nations,5 wherein nearly all decisions were taken centrally in 
London. 
                                                        
5 This relationship differs from Catalonia and Flanders. Both Catalonia and Flanders were subordinate to their 
respective central governments as territories of the state; Scotland is not a territory of the United Kingdom 
but is rather a member of the union. This is an important rhetorical difference. 
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Party system and voting structure 
 During the reign of General Francisco Franco, political parties were essentially non-
existent as the military, under Franco’s control, ruled the government and squashed any potential 
threat to its power. Following his 1975 death, a Spanish party system started to develop as Spain 
began the path towards democratization. The first elections in Spain occurred on 15 June 1977, 
less than two years after Franco’s death (Dowling, 2013). The newly written Spanish Constitution 
provided for these elections to operate based upon system of proportional representation in which 
universal suffrage to all Spanish citizens, above the legal voting age of 18, applies. These elections 
featured four main parties: the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), the Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE), the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), and the Popular Alliance (AP) 
(Story, 2007). Two major regional parties also developed: the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and 
the Democratic Pact for Catalonia (PDC) (Story, 2007). 
 Prior to the federalization of Belgium, there were significantly fewer political parties than 
there are today in federalized Belgium. Some of the most prominent political parties during this 
pre-federalized period and during the beginning of the federalization project include: the Christian 
People’s Party, the Socialist Party, the People’s Union, and the PRL-FDF (Liberal Reformist Party 
– Democratic Front of Francophones). Additionally, some regional parties were gaining strength, 
especially in Flanders, including: Flemish Liberals and Democrats and the Flemish Block. 
(Deschouwer, 2012). Similar to Spain, the Belgian legislature was, and still is, elected based upon 
a system of proportional representation. It is also important to note that voting is mandatory in 
Belgium, unsurprisingly producing some of the highest voter turnout rates in the entire world 
(Deschouwer, 2012). This means that all parties, including regional and secessionist parties, need 
to focus less energy than parties in other countries where voting is not mandatory on getting people 
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to vote, and can exert more of their effort on influencing people to support their platform and vote 
for their party.  
 Two years prior to the creation of the modern Scottish Parliament in 1999, the British 
government held its general election. The three main parties competing in this election cycle and 
for several prior elections were: the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal 
Democratic Party. Whilst the Spanish and Belgians utilize a system of proportional representation 
in their electoral systems, the United Kingdom opts for an electoral system based upon plurality 
(of first past the post) voting. In such a system, it is considerably more difficult for small political 
parties to gain any serious influence in the Parliament. In the United Kingdom, where a party 
obtains its votes is often more important than the amount of votes it receives. Due to this system, 
the British Parliament had been dominated by two parties (Labour and Conservative) for several 
decades. In these 1997 elections, the Labour Party earned a decisive victory, leading to the 
government of Prime Minister Tony Blair (Töngür, 2014). Whilst the Labour and Conservative 
parties tended to dominate the British political scene, the Liberal Democrats often earned enough 
seats to play some sort of role in the government.6 Interestingly enough, however, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), which has been active since the 1920s, had been unable to gain any seats in 
Westminster as the Labour Party had historically dominated the Scottish electorate. 
 The party system and the structure of the electoral system in each one of these states is 
important for understanding the strength of the regional party systems that develop through the 
process of devolution in each case. In Catalonia, democracy was very new so there was not a very 
strong party system prior to devolution. The system that was in place was primarily dominated by 
Spanish-wide parties but regional parties were beginning to develop. In Flanders, experience with 
                                                        
6 Although it should be noted that a coalition involving the Liberal Democratic party was quite rare. 
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democracy was far from new but with the centralized system and the proportional representative 
electoral procedures, the Belgian Parliament was dominated by Belgian wide parties. Although, 
like in Catalonia, regional parties were present, just not strong. Scotland, who has had an extensive 
history with democracy within the United Kingdom, operated within a plurality based electoral 
system which was dominated by British parties. Most notably, the Labour Party found a lot of 
success historically in Scotland. The main regional party, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has 
been active since the 1920s but had not been able to garner any seats in Westminster due to the 
plurality system and the popularity of the Labour Party within Scotland. 
Claims making of the secessionist movements 
 The claims that secessionist movements make for secession are important to understanding 
how they operate and how they foresee any possible future independence. Prior to devolution in 
Catalonia, the claims that the Catalan secessionist movement were primarily focused on cultural 
issues as well as some economic issues. Obviously, cultural issues were very important to the 
Catalans as their culture and language were significantly and harshly targeted by the Franco 
regime. Cultural, in this sense, refers more specifically to linguistic and identity politics and 
policies. The practice and expression of the Catalan culture and the use of the Catalan language 
were forbidden for several decades, whilst education policies were centrally controlled and 
administered in Madrid. Throughout the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, a cultural 
transformation, that was a result of the changing political culture in Spain and the oppressiveness 
of the Franco regime, was occurring in Catalonia (Dowling, 2013). This process presented itself 
in the form of folkloric regionalism, high cultural expressions of Catalan culture, and 
‘underground’ Catalan literature and expressions of visual and performing arts. This cultural 
transformation helped resolve divisions that existed within the Catalan opposition to the Spanish 
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government. This transformation also produced an ‘underground’ environment in which political 
organizers could gather to discuss aspects of Catalan secessionism without interference from the 
oppressive Franco regime (see: Dowling, 2013). 
 Additionally, the Catalans were unhappy with the economic situation in a struggling Spain 
leaving an authoritarian regime. Barcelona was one of Europe’s busiest and most profitable ports 
but the economic and fiscal policies running this region and city were controlled by Madrid, not 
Barcelona. Madrid had ‘always’ been the political and administrative center and capital of the 
modern Spanish state but Barcelona had grown to become Spain’s financial and industrial center. 
The power of Barcelona became a way for the Catalans to expose Spaniards and people from all 
around the world to their culture. Catalonia’s large economic output required markets outside of 
Catalonia. Throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, Spain acted as the largest market for the 
sale of Catalan products (and services) (Dowling, 2013). The Spanish economy was struggling 
during the democratic transition period and these economic issues became another form of 
grievance claiming of the Catalan secessionist movement, although their primary claims at this 
time remained cultural in nature. 
 The claims of the Flemish secessionist movement prior to the period of federalization and 
devolution largely centered on cultural issues, similar to Catalonia, but also incorporated some 
political claims. The Flemish argued that they were not able to culturally flourish because of the 
subordination that their language suffered to that of the Walloons within the Belgian state (de 
Winter and Baudewyns, 2009). Linguistic issues were a large part of the Flemish secessionist 
movement’s claims making prior to the federalization of the country. Economic issues became 
more and more prevalent in Flanders as Flanders had attracted a lot of new industry after the 
Second World War, and these new industries were just starting to boom. Meanwhile, Wallonia’s 
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economy, which was heavily based on the production of steel and coal, started to decline. 7 
Interestingly enough, the Flemish members of Belgian Parliament did not try to exploit their 
position as the majority in the Parliament, and did not steer the Belgian state towards further 
promotion of Flemish interests (Deschouwer, 2012). Instead, it sought devolution of certain 
cultural competencies to the regional level. Whilst economic issues were important to the Flemish, 
they did not become a major part of the claims making of the secessionist movement.  
 The Flemish did have political concerns that became a part of their claims making, although 
still not to the extent that cultural and linguistic issues were.  
The Flemish secessionist movement argued that the Flemish were not properly represented within 
the Belgian state (Fitzmaurice, 1996). If the Flemish were a majority of the population of the 
country, they should at least have a majority of the influence in the capital and should not be 
politically inferior to a minority population. This situation was especially pertinent when 
considering the history of the favoritism that the Belgian state showed towards the Walloons and 
the Francophones over the Flemish since its independence from the Netherlands. 
 Prior to the period of devolution that occurred within the United Kingdom, the claims 
making of the Scottish secessionist movement primarily focused on political issues. Many Scots 
felt that the United Kingdom did not provide the Scottish a fair say in the actions and decisions of 
the government. The concept of “why should Scots be forced to send their children off to a war 
that they don’t support that was launched by a party [Conservative] that Scotland has never 
supported?” played quite heavily in the discourse surrounding Scottish secessionism (Töngür, 
2014). The fact that British politics were dominated by the English, who tend to vote much more 
                                                        
7 Belgium’s membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, undoubtedly 
contributed, at least in part, to the economic decline in Wallonia. Due to the ECSC, the Walloon 
industries had to compete with the French and German industries (Deshouwer, 2012).  
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conservatively than the Scottish, was a major concern of the Scots and was one of their main claims 
for secession. 
 The Catalan, Flemish, and Scottish secessionist movements had varying types of claims 
for independence prior to the periods of devolution that occurred within their respective states. The 
Catalan claims primarily centered around cultural issues but also incorporated some key economic 
issues as well. The Flemish claims were mostly focused upon cultural and linguistic issues whilst 
also involving various important political aspects. The Scottish claims were a bit different, as 
cultural claims were less relevant due to the high level of cultural and linguistic similarity that the 
Scots experienced within the United Kingdom. Scottish claims heavily focused on political issues 
surrounding their representation, influence, and the decision making processes within the state. 
Support and organization for secession 
 Prior to the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975, showing public support for Catalan 
secession was very risky. In an undemocratic, authoritarian regime that suppressed minority 
populations and nations, such as the Catalans, mass, public organization of a secessionist 
movement in Catalonia prior to Franco’s death was essentially impossible. Instead, the Catalan 
movement needed to operate in an ‘underground’ manner (see: Dowling, 2013). The repression of 
public organization and endorsement of secession and the lack of Spanish democracy meant that 
there was no political party championing the Catalan case for secession during this time period. 
This ‘underground’ movement, however, was active, as Catalan cultural and intellectual elites 
promoted the possibility of Catalan secession. Catalan autonomy became an important topic of 
discussion amongst many Catalans (Dowling, 2013; Serrano, 2013), but was not something that 
was organized on a mass level until after the death of General Franco and during the process of 
Spanish democratization and federalization.  
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 Support for secessionist parties in Flanders prior to the devolution in Belgium was minimal 
due to the fact that there were not any serious, strongly organized secessionist parties competing 
in the Belgian political scene. There were, at times, Flemish (and Walloon) parties in the Belgian 
Parliament, but they did not garner a lot of votes and did not play a large role in the formation of 
the government or in the development of important legislation. Support for devolution was strong 
amongst Flemish members of Belgian Parliament and amongst much of the Flemish electorate 
(Deshouwer, 2012; de Winter and Baudewyns, 2009). This support became evident during the 
solidification of the Flemish party system, which included Flemish secessionist parties, that 
occurred following the initial devolution and the federalization process in Belgium that began in 
1970. 
 Unlike in Catalonia and Flanders, Scotland had a pro-independence party long before the 
devolution that occurred within the United Kingdom. The Scottish National Party (SNP), which 
has been a secessionist party since its beginnings in the 1920s, had varying levels of support from 
the Scottish electorate and population throughout the twentieth century. As previously discussed, 
the party had a difficult time competing with the Labour Party for votes within Scotland, but its 
presence in the campaigns provided the SNP with media attention and access to information 
channels throughout Scotland for several decades preceding the devolution in the late 1990s. This 
media attention and access was not available to the Catalan and Flemish secessionist movements 
in the same way as the Scottish because there was no party (for varying reasons) championing the 
cause for independence prior to their respective periods of devolution. While the support for this 
Scottish secessionist party was not strong in comparison to some of the other parties in Scotland 
throughout this pre-devolution time period, the party was centrally organized, well established, 
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and had media and information connections that it could use to promote the cause of Scottish 
independence and the push for devolution. 
 The organization of the pro-secessionist movements in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland 
were all very different from one another in the time periods preceding their respective experiences 
with devolution. That Catalans had little to no vocal, mass, public support or organization for 
secession or autonomy due to the lack of democracy and freedom of expression. Oppression meant 
that the organization and discussions regarding any possible secession or future devolution must 
occur in an ‘underground’ manner. In Flanders, this type of oppression was not an issue and free 
discussion was possible. There was no pro-secessionist party relevantly competing within Belgian 
politics, despite the presence of a few regional parties. Public support for autonomy and secession 
was present in Flanders and became even more noticeable with the solidification of the Flemish 
party system during the devolution and federalization processes. Scotland had a very different 
situation due to the fact that they had a pro-independence party that has been active since the 1920s, 
around 70 years prior to the period of devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament. This 
experience with the secessionist SNP party was important because the SNP had access to media 
and information channels due to its organization and established position.  
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DEVOLUTION 
Establishment of the regional legislative institution 
 El Parlament de Catalunya (the Parliament of Catalonia) was originally founded in 1932, 
but was exiled between the years 1939 and 1975 under the authoritarian military regime in Spain, 
in which democratic institutions were prohibited (Dowling, 2013). The death of General Francisco 
Franco in November 1975 led to a period of democratization in Spain. The democratization process 
in Spain in the late 1970s involved the creation of a federalized Spanish state. As a part of this 
federalization process, seventeen comunidades autónomas were recognized and regional 
legislative institutions were created. In Catalonia, this meant the return of El Parlament de 
Catalunya (El Parlament). 
 The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 1979 officially recognized the return of El 
Parlament (see: Strubell, 1999; Atkinson, 1999; Rex, 1999). El Parlament de Catalunya is a 
unicameral regional legislative body comprised of 135 members. Elections for El Parlament de 
Catalunya are held every four years. El Parlament is tasked with electing the President of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya, passing Catalan legislation, and to approve and pass the budget of the 
autonomous community of Catalonia (Sobrequés et al., 2005).    
El Parlament held its first elections since its banishment on the 20th of March 1980. In 
these elections, the Convergence and Union (CiU) received 27.8 percent of the vote (43 seats), the 
Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC) received 22.4 percent of the vote (33 seats), and the Unified 
Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) received 5.6 percent of the vote (25 seats) (Sureda, 2005). It 
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is important to note that the parties receiving the greatest amount of seats are Catalan parties, not 
Spanish-wide, state-level parties. 
The process of federalization in Belgium was not quick. Federalization and its 
accompanying devolution of powers and competencies are institutionally very difficult to facilitate 
from the ground up. From the beginning of the process to the point where the federal units were 
fully functional and recognized by the Belgian Constitution took a little over 22 years (Swenden 
and Jans, 2009).  
The Belgian government, under severe pressure from the years of campaigning and 
petitioning by Flemish members of Belgian Parliament, began this process of devolution and 
federalization in 1970 with the formal recognition of ‘language communities’. Three language 
communities were officially recognized: Flemish, Francophone, and German speaking (Brans et 
al., 2009; Deshouwer, 2012). As a part of this process, the Vlaamse Raad (the Flemish Council) 
was created. The Vlaamse Raad met for the first time on 7 December 1971 as a part of the 
beginning of the federalization of Belgium. The federalization process and devolution continued 
into 1980 when the Belgian government agreed upon the operationalization of two distinct regions 
with legislative powers – Wallonia and Flanders. The recognition of these two communities, which 
would later be joined by a third (the capital region of Brussels) in 1989, led to the creation of 
regional parliaments. The Vlaamse Raad officially became the Vlaamse Parlement (the Flemish 
Parliament) in 1995. Some scholars (Fitzmaurice, 1996; Deschouwer, 2012). argued to have 
marked the completion of the federalization of Belgium.  
The Vlaamse Parlement is comprised of 124 directly elected representatives that represent 
the Flemish nation at the regional level in Belgium. The Vlaamse Parlement is tasked with passing 
Flemish laws within their devolved competencies, approving the Flemish regional budget, and 
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organizing and administering the Flemish government (Deschouwer, 2012). The Vlaamse 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, or Members of Flemish Parliament (MFPs), have been directly elected 
since 1995. The first elections to the Vlaamse Parlament occurred in 1995. In these elections, the 
Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V) won 37 seats, the Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats (VLD) won 27, the Socialist Party (SP) won 26, and the Flemish Block won 17 
(Vermessen, 1995). Similar to the results that the Catalans saw in their first regional elections, the 
regional parties dominated the first elections to the Vlaamse Parlement. 
The desire for Scottish independence existed throughout the twentieth century and began 
growing in the late 1960s. Since there already existed a pro-independence party in Scotland (SNP), 
the mobilization for independence in the early 1970s was very easily facilitated. This mobilization, 
which was not very large but was “loud” enough to be recognized by the British government, 
resulted in a legal referendum on devolution of British powers to Scotland on the 1st of May 1979. 
The referendum was a success, with approximately 51 percent of Scots (that participated in the 
referendum) voting for the implementation of the 1978 Scotland Act (Töngür, 2014). The 
referendum led to the devolution of some minor powers (mostly focused on educational policy 
autonomy) from the British government to localized Scottish governments, but the referendum 
failed to create a Scottish Assembly or a Scottish Parliament, meaning that any further devolution 
of powers to “Scotland” would be very difficult.  
One factor that pushed the Scots even further towards the idea of independence was the 
rule of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher and the Conservative Party, 
which began ruling in 1979, implemented neoliberal policies and attempted to make large cuts to 
the British welfare state. These two policy decisions have historically been very unpopular in 
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Scotland, and proved to be significant grievances of the Scottish secessionist movement during the 
Thatcher government (Stewart, 2009; Töngür, 2014).  
The Scotland Act of 1978 and the government of Margaret Thatcher pushed the Scots 
further towards greater autonomy. This push for autonomy brought about another referendum on 
11 September 1997. This referendum was a question about the creation of a Scottish Parliament. 
Over 74 percent of voters voted in favor of creating a Scottish Parliament and the referendum 
triggered the Scotland Act of 1998, creating the modern Scottish Parliament (Töngür, 2014). The 
Scottish Parliament, or Pàrlamaid na h-Alba as it is named in Gaelic or The Scots Pairlament as 
it is called in Scots, is a unicameral legislative body comprised of 129 seats that are directly elected 
every four years on the basis of proportional representation, unlike the British elections which use 
a plurality electoral system.  
The inaugural elections to the modern Scottish Parliament resulted in the Labour Party 
winning 56 seats, the Scottish National Party (SNP) winning 35, The Conservative Party winning 
18, and the Liberal Democratic Party winning 17. It is important to note, her, that the party 
garnering the greatest amount of seats was a British party, not a Scottish regional party. This is in 
contrast to the inaugural elections to the Catalan and Flemish regional legislative institutions where 
the regional parties were more successful. 
Competencies and powers devolved 
 The devolution of competencies and powers to the regional level that accompanied the 
creation of these aforementioned regional legislative institutions is critical to the functioning of 
the institutions and is important to the parties that take control of these regional governments. 
Importantly, the devolution that occurred from the Spanish government to El Parlament de 
Catalunya included the devolution of educational policies. The Catalans received the right to teach 
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in their own language and promote their own unique culture and heritage through this educational 
system. Additionally, several other cultural rights and competencies were devolved to the Catalans, 
allowing the Catalans to make decisions for themselves when it comes to issues such as: regional 
holidays, official language and usage, ceremonies, etc. (Burg, 2015). 
 Very few economic and financial competencies were devolved to the regional level in 
Spain. Most economic policies are still made by the Cortes Generales meaning that Catalonia still 
has little influence over its own economic and financial issues. In terms of political issues, the 
most important devolution was the creation of El Parlament itself. This new institution allows the 
Catalans to have their own government in which their issues can be discussed. Whilst their ability 
to gain more direct influence in Madrid has not changed as their seats are constrained by the size 
of their population relative to that of Spain, El Parlament and its new competencies allow the 
Catalans to make many decisions for themselves that they had previously not been able to do. This 
decision-making power is especially important in the area of cultural issues, which, as previously 
discussed, was an area of secessionist claims making that was very important to the Catalans prior 
to this devolution. 
 The devolution of powers and competencies within Belgium occurred over time, 
throughout the twenty two year process of federalization. The first major round of devolution 
occurred in 1980. In 1980, the competencies that were devolved to Flanders included: employment 
policy, public investment management, economic development policy, housing policy, and 
structural and urban planning (Brans et al., 2009). Further powers were devolved in 1989, 
including: scientific research initiatives and transportation policy. In 1993, even more 
competencies were devolved to the regional level, including: social assistance policies and even 
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some aspects of foreign policy (Brans et al., 2009; Beyers et al., 2009).8  These competencies 
became even more important when the Vlaamse Raad became the Vlaamse Parlement in 1995 and 
the Flemish people were directly electing parties to manage these competencies. In 1992, a major 
constitutional change took place. The Belgian Constitution officially recognized Belgium as a 
federal state for the first time, acknowledging the powers of the three distinct regions and the three 
language communities (Brans et al., 2009; Billiet et al., 2009). 
 Most of the powers and competencies that have been devolved from the United Kingdom 
to Scotland occurred in conjunction with the 1999 creation of the Scottish Parliament. Scotland, 
via their new parliament, had several powers devolved to it, including: educational and training 
policies, local governing, social working, housing policies, tourism control, sports legislation, 
forestry and fishing, and several aspects of transportation within Scotland (Buchanan, C., 2007a; 
Buchanan, C., 2007b; Töngür, 2014). It should be noted, however, that these devolved powers do 
nothing to directly change the level of Scottish representation9 in Westminster, one of the most 
significant secessionist claims of the Scottish secessionist movement and the Scottish National 
Party.  
Parties in control / leading the charge 
 Much of the Catalan secessionist movement prior to the death of General Franco in 1975 
was not a part of the popular discourse. This ‘underground’ nature of the movement was due to 
the lack of the ability to strongly and publicly organize in the face of Franco’s oppressive regime 
and the lack of democratic parties in the autocratic state of Spain. Following Franco’s death and 
                                                        
8 i.e. Ratifying treaties and negotiating on behalf of regional interests at the European level. 
9 With little exception, the only people voting for Scottish parties (primarily the SNP) are Scottish. The 
Scottish have a limited amount of districts represented in Westminster. Without expanding the size of 
Scotland relative to the United Kingdom, there is essentially a cap on how many seats a regional Scottish 
party can obtain. 
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during the Spanish transition from autocracy to democracy, the Spanish party system began to take 
form. During this formation, the Catalan secessionist movement was able to organize itself through 
this party system, which included a few Catalan regional parties. Most important for leading the 
charge for devolution during this time period was the Convergència i Unió party (CiU) (see: 
Dowling, 2013). The CiU was not a secessionist party during this transition period but was an 
organized party pushing for increased Catalan autonomy. The party promoted a platform of 
creating a Catalonia with increased autonomy that would unify the decimated Catalan nation within 
Spain (Dowling, 2013).  Devolution in Spain, as noted, was not exclusive to the Catalans as it was 
occurring during a time of democratization and federalization throughout the whole state. 
 It would be incorrect to say that there was one specific political party in Flanders that was 
leading the charge for devolution in Belgium. Prior to the beginning of this federal project in 1970, 
Flemish regional parties had very little success in the Belgian general elections. Much of the 
pressure that the Belgian government was coming from a large social movement that took place in 
the Flemish public sphere and debate as well as from the Flemish members of Belgian Parliament 
within various political parties (Deschouwer, 2012; Peters, 2009). The main parties in Belgium 
(including the Christian Social Party, Belgian Socialist Party, and the Party for Freedom and 
Progress) were feeling pressure over the growing discussion over Flemish autonomy and 
secession.  
 Following the creation of the Vlaamse Raad and the beginning of the federalization project 
in Belgium, the Flemish regional parties began organizing in a more structured manner, splitting 
along political ideological lines amongst themselves and amongst linguistic lines from the Walloon 
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parties, creating an asymmetrical10 federalized and regionalized party system. The parties also 
began solidifying their stances on devolution and secessionism.  
 As the federalization process continued throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, 
support for Belgian parties declined and support for regional parties (in both Flanders and 
Wallonia) grew. Similar in ways to Catalonia, it was not a single, organized political party that 
was pushing for this secession; rather, it was an organized public movement in favor of changing 
the status quo combined with pressure from Flemish members of Belgian Parliament that led to 
this devolution (Deschouwer, 2012; Swenden and Jans, 2009). It was following the change in 
devolution that the Flemish parties, including the secessionist parties, truly solidified and began 
growing in strength amongst the Flemish electorate. 
 In both the Catalan and Flemish cases, there was not a single party leading the charge for 
devolution or for secession during the period of devolution and federalization that occurred within 
both states. In Scotland, this is not the case. The Scottish National Party (SNP) led the charge for 
devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament. The SNP was virtually the only regional 
party that represented Scotland. The party faced its biggest electoral competition from the British 
parties, most notably the Labour Party, not from another regional party. In Catalonia and Flanders, 
the regional parties had to contend with other regional parties for votes, whereas in Scotland, this 
was not the case. Due the obvious electoral restraints that the SNP faces due to its regionalization 
within the Scottish electorate, it is very difficult for the party to gain an influential amount of seats 
in Westminster. The creation of the Scottish Parliament, however, created another outlet of 
                                                        
10 In a symmetrical federalized party system, the parties would cooperate with ideologically similar parties across the language or 
ethnic border whilst in an asymmetrical federalized party system, the parties are split by the linguistic or ethnic divide that splits 
parties from their ideological counterparts (Billiet et al., 2009; Swenden and Jans, 2009). In an asymmetrical system, a Flemish 
social democratic party is more likely to cooperate with a conservative party than with a Walloon social democratic party. This 
phenomenon is not unique to Belgium; a strong comparison can be made to the asymmetric party system that existed in the 
Former Yugoslavia (de Winter et al., 2009; Bunce, 1998). Refer to de Winter et al. (2009) for a more thorough discussion on this 
comparison. 
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influence for the SNP. The SNP could focus its attention on earning seats in Edinburgh’s 
Holyrood11 rather than exclusively focusing on a ‘losing battle’ in Westminster. It is clear, though, 
that the SNP had a lot of influence, by bringing Scottish issues to the forefront of the Scottish 
population and to the British government in Westminster, in the devolution process as a 
representative of the Scottish secessionist movement (see: Töngür, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 The Scottish Parliament. 
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POST-DEVOLUTION 
Regional parties and secessionist parties 
 Today, several decades following the democratization of Spain and the devolution that 
occurred with regards to Catalonia, there are over ten Catalan parties that operate within the 
Catalan political arena and there are also several Spanish-wide parties that also garner votes in 
Catalonia. Some of the more prominent Catalan regional parties in the post-devolution time period 
include: the Convergence and Union (CiU) (which dissolved in 2015), Together for Yes (JxSí) 
(formed following the 2012 elections as a coalition of pro-independence parties, including the 
CiU), the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), Catalan Solidarity for Independence (SI), and the 
Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE). 
 The Flemish party system solidified following the federalization of Belgium and 
subsequent regionalization of the country’s party system. Some of the most prominent Flemish 
regional parties include: New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), Christian Democratic and Flemish 
(CD&V), Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld), Socialist Party Different (sp.a), and 
the Flemish Interest. The subject of secession and Flemish independence has become an 
increasingly important aspect of the party system, although essentially every major Flemish party 
is pushing for further devolution and greater Flemish autonomy. The N-VA and the Vlaams Belang 
are pro-secessionist parties; their support often tends to follow other Flemish parties who support 
further devolution and increased autonomy within Belgium in lieu of secession. 
 There is not as much of a Scottish party system as there is in Catalonia and Flanders. In the 
time following the devolution that occurred within the United Kingdom and the creation of the 
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Scottish Parliament, the Scottish National Party (SNP) confirmed itself as a political force within 
Scotland. The SNP is undoubtedly the strongest Scottish regional party and is the only one who 
has achieved any measurable electoral success. Support for the SNP has been growing at quite a 
rapid rate since the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, further asserting the SNP as not 
just the voice of the Scottish secessionist movement but now as the voice of the Scottish electorate. 
Changing claims of the movement 
 In the origins of the Catalan secessionist movement, the movement sought independence 
on the basis of protecting the Catalan nation’s culture, language, and identity. Following the 
creation of El Parlament de Catalunya and its accompanying devolution of competencies in the 
1970s and 1980s, the issue of protecting the Catalan identity became less important. The 
devolution in Spain created this Catalan regional government that was allowed the competencies 
to legislate over identity, linguistic, cultural, and educational issues. Once these original claims for 
secession based upon cultural and linguistic grievances were more or less settled,12 the Catalan 
secessionist movement, spearheaded by the Convergència i Unió (CiU), moved a lot of its claims 
towards the economic grievances that many Catalans believed that they were enduring as a 
consequence of their presence within the Spanish state (Burg, 2015; Dowling, 2013).  
 As previously mentioned, Barcelona has grown to become the banking and financial sector 
of Spain (Dowling, 2013). The often claim that the Spanish government operates a taxation and 
distribution of wealth system that disadvantages Catalonia, its businesses, and its economic growth 
potential (Dowling, 2013; Burg, 2015). El Parlament has few competencies in the areas of 
economic and finances with most decisions being made in Madrid. These economic grievances 
                                                        
12 Historic Catalanism (~1933 – 1970-80s) made claims for the protection of the Catalan language and 
culture, and modern Catalanism (1980s – onward) makes claims for economic, fiscal, and political 
independence. Historic Catalanism triumphed and accordingly, the goals of the Catalan national movement 
changed (Burg, 2015). 
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have become central to the claims making of the Catalan secessionist movement in the post-
devolution time period (see Dowling, 2013). 
 The initial claims of the Flemish secessionist movement were both cultural and political in 
nature. Culturally and linguistically, the Flemish argued that they were not treated fairly because 
the official language of the government was that of the minority French speaking population and 
because they felt that the Walloons were politically advantaged in the government (Beyers and 
Bursen, 2009; Deschouwer, 2012). Similar to what occurred in Catalonia, the creation of the 
Vlaamse Parlement and the subsequent devolution of competencies to the regional level in 
Belgium allowed the Flemish to administer their own policies over the areas of culture, language, 
and education. This devolution effectively alleviated many of the problems that the Flemish had 
previously felt.  
 The Flemish also claimed that they were disadvantaged politically by their position within 
Belgium. In the sense, a majority of the country was not receiving a majority of the representation 
in the government and many Flemish claimed that they should be making decisions for themselves, 
not in conjunction with the Walloons (Beyers and Bursen, 2009; Deschouwer, 2012). The Flemish 
secessionist movement transitioned its secessionist claims making from predominantly cultural 
claims to political claims for autonomy and self-rule as the devolution process proceeded. The 
need for the cultural and linguistic claims for secession and autonomy became increasingly 
irrelevant so these political claims took precedence within the movement.  
 The claims for secession of the modern Scottish secessionist movement have primarily 
focused upon political issues. The Scottish have argued that they are not appropriately represented 
within the United Kingdom and that their voices are neither heard nor respected in Westminster. 
The union of the nations within the United Kingdom is being seen less and less favorably by many 
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Scots because they believe that the political system and the decision-making processes within the 
United Kingdom are dominated by the English, leaving little room for Scottish influence (Mack, 
2007; Keating, 2010; Töngür, 2014). The creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and the 
accompanying devolution did not change the nature of these claims. 
 The claims of the Scottish secessionist movement, under the leadership of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), continued to strongly be for secession. The devolution that occurred within 
the United Kingdom did little nothing to alleviate the main claims for secession that the movement 
had been making prior to devolution. This is, of course, in contrast to the Catalan and Flemish 
cases where the devolution processes in each country helped alleviate some of their main claims. 
The alleviation of some of the main claims in these two cases is likely due to the nature of the 
claims being cultural rather than purely political in nature. Cultural and linguistic issues are 
seemingly easier for a government to act in a manner that would appease the demands of the 
movement, whereas political issues involving the structure of the government and the amount of 
representation that a group receives within the government are much more difficult to change. 
 The British Parliament still, to this day, needs to approve the budget that the Scottish 
Parliament operates with every year and at any point the government in Westminster can revoke 
and of the competencies delegated to Scotland. These issues are serious concerns for the SNP and 
the Scottish secessionist movement, helping maintain their claims for secession on the basis of 
political issues and their lack of representation in the government of the United Kingdom. 
Support for secession and regional parties 
 The inaugural elections to El Parlament de Catalunya in 1980 saw the Convergence and 
Union (CiU) receive 27.8 percent of the vote (43 seats), the Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC) 
receive 22.4 percent of the vote (33 seats), and the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) 
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receive 5.6 percent of the vote (25 seats) (Sureda, 2005). As discussed previously, none of these 
parties were explicitly secessionist at the time. 
 The 2012 elections to El Parlament were focused around one primary issueL the 
relationship between Spain and Catalonia. The Republican Right of Catalonia – Yes Catalonia 
(ERC), the Solidarity for Independence (SI), and the CiU were in favor of secession, while the 
PSC-PSOE was largely split on the issue (Pujadas and Xifra, 2014). In these 2012 Catalan 
elections, recording the highest turnover ever in the history Catalan Parliamentary elections (Burg, 
2015; Dowling, 2013), the CiU won 38.4% of the vote (62 seats), PSC won 14.4$ of the vote (20 
seats), the ERC won 13.7% of the vote (21 seats), People’s Party of Catalonia (PPC) won 13.0% 
of the vote (19 seats), and notably Ciudadanos (‘Citizens’ – a Spanish party) won 7.6% of the vote 
(9 seats) (Martí, 2013).  
The pro-secessionist parties in Catalonia in 2012, notably the CiU and the ERC, did well 
electorally, in a way that they had not done in the past. The success of regional parties and, more 
specifically, pro-secessionist parties, dominated the Catalan elections in 2012. 
In January 2013, the new Catalan (CiU led) government issued a “Declaration of 
Sovereignty,” that defined Catalonia as a “sovereign political subject” (Burg, 2015). The Spanish 
Constitutional Court would overturn this declaration in March 2014, with the announcement by 
the Court that only “Spanish people” could enjoy sovereignty (Burg, 2015). The following month, 
in April 2014, the Cortes Generales rejected the Catalans request to hold a referendum on 
independence. However, in May the Catalans began preparing for the referendum against the will 
of the Cortes Generales (Burg, 2015). The Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the referendum 
in October of 2014, claiming that it was unconstitutional.  
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Despite the Court’s rulings, on 9 November 2014, the Catalans held an unofficial 
referendum. Turnout for this unofficial vote was very low, but 80.76% of those that voted, voted 
in favor of independence (Burg, 2015). It is plausible that we can attribute the low levels of voter 
participation to the fact that the referendum was unofficial and that the results could not directly 
result in independence. This vote can be viewed as somewhat symbolic, but it should not be viewed 
as insignificant as it is an example of how the Catalan secessionist movement has grown and 
changed since the beginning of the devolution process in the 1970s. 
Elections took place again in Catalonia in 2015. These elections saw the Together for Yes 
(JxSí) win a commanding 39.6% of the vote (62 seats), Ciudadanos (a Spanish-wide party with 
many Catalan members) win 17.9% of the vote (25 seats), and PSC receive 12.7% of the vote (16 
seats) (Rawlinson, 2015). It is important to notice that the CiU had dissolved and did not compete 
in the election, but rather that the party merged into the JxSí with other pro-secessionist minded 
groups. The JxSí is a party coalition that is pushing for Catalan independence.  
Just as in 2012, the 2015 Catalan Parliamentary elections indicated a large basis of support 
for secession in terms of electoral behavior in Catalonia. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
state-wide, Spanish party, Cuidadanos gained a lot more votes in 2015 than they had in 2012. It is 
clear, now, several decades following the creation of El Parlament de Catalunya and the processes 
of democratization and devolution that occurred within Spain, that Catalan regional parties, 
including secessionist parties, dominate contemporary Catalan politics. 
The first elections to the Vlaamse Parlement occurred in 1995. Recall that the Vlaamse 
Raad (Flemish Council) was formed in 1971, but directly elected regional parliamentary governing 
did not occur until the switch to the Vlaamse Parlement in 1995. These elections saw, most 
notably, the Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V) win 37 of the 124 seats, the Flemish 
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Liberals and Democrats (VLD) win 27, the Socialist Party (SP) win 26, and the Flemish Block 
won 17.  
In these 1995 elections to the Vlaamse Parlement, Flemish regional parties were quite 
successful, as the Belgian party system was in the process of being regionalized. The SP, a Belgian 
party, also gained a relatively large number of seats in this regional legislature. 
The most recent elections in Flanders, the 2014 Vlaamse Parlement elections, resulted in a 
victory for the pro-secessionist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), with them receiving 42 seats. The 
CD&V won 26 seats, the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld) won 17 seats, the 
Socialist Party Differently (sp.a) also won 17, and the Flemish Interest won 6 seats (Statista, 2014). 
The Flemish electorate spoke loudly and clearly in 2014 at the polls. Regional parties 
dominated the 2014 elections to the Vlaamse Parlement. The regionalization of the party system 
in Belgium is clear. The Flemish are voting for Flemish parties and the Walloons are voting for 
Walloon parties (Swenden and Jans, 2009). Several decades after the beginning of the Belgian 
federalization project with the creation of the regional legislative institutions and the devolution 
process, regional parties dominate the Belgian political system. Unlike in Catalonia, there has been 
no organized referendum on Flemish secession. This lack of referenda is perhaps due to the 
strength of the Flemish regional parties at not only the regional level but also at the state-wide, 
Belgian level (in the Belgian Parliament) (Burg, 2015). 
The first election to the modern Scottish Parliament occurred in 1999. This election saw 
the Labour Party winning 56 of the 129 seats, the Scottish National Party (SNP) winning 35, the 
Conservative Party winning 18, and the Liberal Democratic Party winning 17. The Labour Party, 
which had historically dominated Scottish electoral politics, continued to show its strength 
throughout the first few elections to the Scottish Parliament. 
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The 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections proved to be a big turning point in the 
progression of the Scottish secessionist movement in the post-devolution time period. The SNP 
won 47 seats, earning one more seat than the Labour Party. This was the first time that the SNP 
had garnered a plurality of the votes in Holyrood and it would not be the last. The SNP has won 
every election since, including the most recent, 2016 elections. In these 2016 elections, the SNP 
won 63 seats, the Conservative Party won 31, and the Labour Party won 24 (Graham and 
Henderson, 2016). 
These 2016 elections were a clear victory for the pro-secessionist SNP. Scottish party 
politics have clearly been regionalized as support for the Scottish regional party has been 
increasing and support for non-Scottish parties has been decreasing. The Labour Party has felt the 
effects of this shift of Scottish support towards the SNP as it struggles to garner enough seats to 
exert the influence that it previously possessed in Westminster (Töngür, 2014). 
On 15 October 2012, the Edinburgh Agreement was signed by the United Kingdom Prime 
Minister David Cameron, Scottish Secretary of State Michael Moore, Scottish First Minister Alex 
Salmond, and Deputy First Minister (and future First Minister) Nicola Sturgeon. The Edinburgh 
Agreement was an agreement that legalized and set plans for a referendum on Scottish 
independence. Both governments agreed that the referendum would be legislated by the Scottish 
Parliament, be conducted in a manner that both Parliaments could be confident that it was fair, 
free, and representative of the views of the Scottish people, and that the result will be respected by 
both Scotland and the United Kingdom. The referendum was scheduled for 18 September 2014 
(Töngür, 2014). Unlike the referendum that took place in Catalonia less than two months later, the 
Scottish independence referendum was legal in the sense that it has been negotiated and agreed to 
by both the Scottish Parliament (SNP) and the British Parliament. 
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Following the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement, the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal 
Democratic parties all jointly promised to “guarantee to start [swiftly] delivering more powers to 
the Scottish Parliament” (Töngür, 2014), although what exactly these powers were to be remained 
quite unclear. The creation of the Scottish Parliament and its accompanied devolved powers were 
now having an effect in Westminster, as party leaders feared a Scottish departure from the union. 
In the time between the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012 and the Scottish 
independence referendum in September 2014, the United Kingdom’s government published 
several booklets and pamphlets on the benefits of staying in the United for Scotland and its people. 
The UK promoted the claims that Scotland is stronger economically, politically, and militarily 
within the United Kingdom than it would be by itself (Töngür, 2014). 
Clearly the Scottish electorate favored a secessionist party in their most recent elections, 
but this was no guarantee that they would do the same in a referendum. On 18 September 2014, 
over 1.6 million Scots went out to the polls to vote in the referendum. The Scottish Parliament 
lowered the voting age from 18 to 16 for the referendum, assuming that younger Scots were more 
likely to favor independence. Despite the success of the pro-independence SNP in recent Scotland, 
British, and European elections, the referendum was not successful. The “No” vote won. More 
than 53 percent of Scots that participated in the referendum voted against independence and in 
favor of remaining a part of the United Kingdom. This result came as a huge relief to the United 
Kingdom and as a shock to the SNP, who was convinced that independence was on the horizon. 
The Scottish Parliament’s First Minister and SNP leader Alex Salmond announced following the 
referendum that he was stepping down from both positions. Nicola Sturgeon became the new First 
Minister of Scotland in November 2014 (Töngür, 2014). 
39 
 
Both Catalonia and Scotland held referendums on independence in the fall of 2014. The 
Catalan referendum, which was unofficial, illegal, and had very low voter turnout (possibly for 
these reasons), resulted in a ‘victory’ for the secessionists as a majority of those who voted 
supported Catalan secession from Spain. In Scotland, an official, legal referendum took place in 
which the secessionists, headed by the SNP, lost. The Scottish electorate voted to remain a member 
of the United Kingdom, to the surprise of many. In Flanders, no such referendum, official or 
unofficial, has taken place.  
It is clear in all three cases – Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland – that the party systems 
have been regionalized. The vast majority of the electorate in all three regions has voted for 
regional parties and not for state-wide parties. This phenomenon is very important because in all 
three cases, the shift to this regionalization of the party system has come following the creation of 
a regional legislature and a major devolution of powers to this new regional level. 
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEVOLUTION: REGIONALIZATION AND 
SECESSIONISM 
  
A push for devolution by a sub-state region with secessionist sentiments creates a serious 
dilemma for states. Should the state create a regional legislative institution for this region? Will 
devolving various powers to this region appease their claims for secession or will it just facilitate 
future moves towards secession? 
 Spain is quite a unique case because the process of federalization and devolution in Spain 
occurred during a period of democratization, which presented its own challenges. However, it is 
clear that the creation of El Parlament de Catalunya and the powers that were devolved to it 
created an environment in which Catalan regional parties could flourish. It is evident that as 
decades have passed since this major act of devolution, the strength of the Catalan regional parties 
has grown much stronger. 
 This phenomenon of regionalization is perhaps even more evident in Belgium. Belgium, 
which prior to 1970 was a centralized state, made the decision to federalize the state in order to 
appease many of the Flemish members of Belgian Parliament. Prior to the creation of the Vlaamse 
Raad and its later transition to the Vlaamse Parlement, Belgian-wide parties performed very well 
in Belgian elections and the few Flemish regional parties struggled. Following the establishment 
of the Vlaamse Parlement, Flemish regional parties grew in numbers and in strength. Flemish 
parties were able to gain more access to power via the Vlaamse Parlement that they had not 
previously been able to do within the Belgian Parliament. Now, a few decades after this process 
of federalization and devolution began, nearly all of the Flemish votes go to Flemish parties and 
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Walloon votes go to Walloon parties. The Belgian party system has been completely regionalized 
and this is largely due to the creation of the Vlaamse Parlement and the devolution of competencies 
and powers to the regional level in Belgium (see: Brancati, 2008). 
 This regionalization of the party system also took place in Scotland. Prior to the creation 
of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and its subsequent acquisition of devolved powers, Scotland’s 
regional party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), had never held any seats in the British 
Parliament. Following the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the SNP was able to obtain seats 
and, in turn, influence, in Edinburgh. This influence was important for the party as they were later 
able to win seats in the British Parliament, as well. Now, the SNP dominates the Scottish electorate, 
winning a vast majority of the seats in Edinburgh’s Holyrood and the majority of Scotland’s seats 
in Westminster. Of course, there is a limit on the amount of seats that the SNP can obtain in 
Westminster due to the party’s regional nature, but its influence in Holyrood should not be 
overlooked. Clearly, the Scottish party system has been regionalized since this major act of 
devolution within the United Kingdom in 1999. Scotland used to predominantly support the 
Labour Party, but today, mostly supports the SNP, their regional party. 
The regional legislative institutions in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland are all now 
controlled by parties that are explicitly secessionist (JxSí in Catalonia, N-VA in Flanders, and the 
SNP in Scotland). The strength of these secessionist parties is largely due to the devolution that 
took place. Secessionist parties are emboldened and strengthened by their ability to gain seats 
within these newly created regional legislative institutions (Brancati, 2008). 
One major and obvious difference between the Scottish secessionist movement and the 
secessionist movements in Catalonia and Flanders is that the Scottish secessionist movement is 
represented by a single secessionist party rather than multiple secessionist parties. This unification 
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under one secessionist party allows for a single, unified message for secession that is presented to 
the Scottish electorate. The Scottish National Party (SNP) is able to be so electorally successful 
within Scotland due to its lack of competition by other regional parties and its encompassing 
secessionist platform. This scenario is different in both Catalonia and Flanders where there are 
several regional parties and more than one secessionist party. 
This key difference in the regionalized party systems can largely be accounted to the 
differences in the state structures and voting systems in both pre-devolution and post-devolution 
time periods. As discussed previously, in the United Kingdom, elections are operated on the basis 
of a plurality (first past the post) electoral system. This system limits the number of parties that are 
able to compete and squeezes out small parties. Once the regionalization of the Scottish party 
system took effect following devolution, the long-established SNP was able to assume the 
dominant role. Due to the system in place, it would be difficult for another, smaller Scottish party 
to overtake the influence of the SNP. In both Catalonia and Flanders, a system of proportional 
representation is utilized, making it easier for smaller parties to compete. This system creates an 
environment in which multiple parties are able to gain access to the government, providing for a 
more competitive environment amongst these regional parties. 
The claims for secession that are made by the secessionist movements, often through these 
secessionist parties, are important to consider. Recall the previous discussion on the claims making 
of the secessionist movements. The pre-devolution claims of the Catalan secessionist movement 
focused on cultural and linguistic claims, the Flemish secessionist movement also focused on 
cultural and linguistic claims, while the Scottish secessionist movement centered on political 
claims. Both the Catalan and Flemish claims for secession changed following the major act of 
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devolution. The Catalan secessionist movement now focuses more heavily on economic claims for 
secession and the Flemish movement on political claims for secession. 
The Catalan and Flemish cultural and linguistic claims have largely been mitigated and 
alleviated via the process of devolution and the creation of regional legislative institutions in which 
cultural and linguistic issues are devolved to this regional level. Therefore, a shift in the claims 
making of the secessionist movements should not have been surprising.  
The economic claims in Catalonia are frequently referenced by some of the more prominent 
Catalan secessionist parties (e.g. JxSí). Economic claims for secession can potentially be alleviated 
through further devolution of powers to El Parlament de Catalunya. This move, however, would 
be risky on the part of the Spanish as they run the risk that providing greater economic autonomy 
to the regional level and, in turn, the regional and secessionist parties could fuel the fire for 
independence even greater (see: Kriacou and Morral-Palacín, 2014).  
The political claims in Flanders are very interesting due to the fact that the Flemish occupy 
a majority of the population of Belgium. Many of these political concerns, mostly regarding 
autonomy and the devolution and federalization of the country, are mitigated by the fact that the 
Flemish are very strong in the national legislature. This strength is in stark contrast to the Catalans 
and the Scottish who have little strength in their respective national legislatures. 
The Scottish case is unique in the sense that the secessionist movement’s claims for 
secession have remained relatively consistent. The main claims are political and primarily focus 
around the idea that the Scottish are not properly represented in London nor are they adequately 
involved in the United Kingdom’s decision-making processes. This issue, unlike the Catalan and 
Flemish grievances, is much more difficult to be resolved. Scotland occupies only a small 
percentage of the population of the United Kingdom and increasing its representation in 
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Westminster inherently means that the level of representation of some or all of the other three 
members of the union would need to be decreased. This scenario would be nearly impossible 
politically to execute. In Scotland, the creation of the Scottish Parliament and its accompanying 
devolution did little to alleviate the concerns of the Scottish whilst simultaneously providing a 
greater platform and strength to Scotland’s secessionist party, the SNP. 
In Catalonia and Flanders, where the creation of regional legislative institutions did 
alleviate many of the original grievances and claims for secession, provoking a change in claims 
making and a shift within and amongst the secessionist parties. It would seem that the claims 
making of the Scottish secessionist movement is more serious, in the sense that alleviating the 
issues behind the claims seems to be the most difficult. Whilst both Scotland and Flanders 
predominantly use political claims for secession, the Flemish case is different due to their strong 
position within Belgium’s national government whilst the Scottish maintain a weak position within 
the United Kingdom’s national government. The effect (or lack thereof in Scotland) of the creation 
of regional legislative institutions, devolution, and the subsequent regionalization of the party 
systems on the claims making of the secessionist parties is a strong example of how this major act 
of devolution has had implications and affected the three secessionist movements. Examining the 
claims making and the change in claims making of these secessionist movements provides insight 
into how the creation of the regional legislative institutions and devolution have affected the 
secessionist movements and the secessionist parties.  
Modern societal relevance 
 It has become clear that when a state chooses to establish a regional legislative institution 
and devolve various powers and competencies to this new institution, it creates a situation in which 
the region’s party system will become regionalized. The regionalization of the party system creates 
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an environment in which a secessionist movement, through one or more secessionist parties, can 
gain strength, support, and influence. This situation brings about an important question: Is it better 
for the state to create a regional legislative institution and to devolve powers to it or is it preferable 
for the state to effectively do nothing when it comes to this region with a secessionist sentiment? 
This question, of course, assumes that the best-case scenario for the state is that the region remains 
a part of the state. 
The evidence found by this study leads to the conclusion that it would be best for a Western 
liberal democratic state to ignore the calls for devolution and autonomy by a sub-state region with 
secessionist sentiments. While it is not ideal for this state to have a part of its country demanding 
political change via the process of devolution, it is still preferable to have to handle this complaint 
than it is to institute this devolution. This devolution will likely lead to a strengthening of the 
region’s regional parties which could have serious political effects throughout the rest of the state 
(i.e. the effect that SNP success has had on the British Labour Party). Additionally, this devolution 
and subsequent regionalization of the party system can provide opportunities for secessionist 
parties that can actually make the calls for secession even more centralized, organized, and 
politically relevant. So while a state may think that it will alleviate or mitigate calls for secession 
by one of its regions, it is for these crucial reasons that it would be best for the state to avoid 
creating a regional legislative institution and devolution.  
On the flip side, it would appear that a good strategy for secessionist movements would be 
to push for the creation of a regional legislative institution that they could use to further their cause. 
While this process may seem hard to do, it has been done several times throughout modern history, 
including in the Catalan, Flemish, and Scottish cases. All three secessionist movements have used 
the creation of this new regional institution and its subsequent effects to further their claims for 
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independence and push for secession from their respective states. The appetite for secession 
continues to be very strong in all three regions (Coppieters, 2012). 
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